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NETWORK ORCHESTRATION: VODAFONE’S JOURNEY TO GLOBALIZATION 
Abstract 
This investigation provides an understanding of network orchestration as an impersonal, 
primordial driving force that challenges the view in organizational design that assigns human 
choice and deliberate intention a central role. The study highlights the importance of emerging 
strategy and the unintended consequence in bringing about a desirable outcome in MNCs’ 
efforts to coordinate and integrate globally-dispersed capabilities. It is based on a longitudinal 
action research that embraces a period of transformational change between Vodafone and 
Ericsson to achieve cash synergies in mobile network operations globally. The findings indicate 
that enabling knowledge mobility, appropriating knowledge, and fostering network stability 
contribute to a successful economic performance as interactive, self-governing processes of 
network orchestration. Accordingly, we conclude that the processes of network orchestration 
must be understood as driven by choice sets taken while creatively coping with change rather 
than as primarily choice sets deliberately taken in the sequential pursuit of goals.   
 
Keywords: Network orchestration, Vodafone, inter-firm relationships, knowledge mobility 
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Introduction 
There has been substantial research on various multinational corporation (MNC) 
configurations in their link to identifying and leveraging capabilities (e.g. Prahalad and Doz, 
1981; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Hedlund, 1994; Gulati et al., 2000). Regardless of whether 
the MNC is conceptualized as a set of internalized cross-border transactions (Buckley and 
Cason, 1976), a differentiated network (Ghoshal and Nohria, 1989; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1997), 
or a social community that crosses national boundaries (Kogut and Zander, 1992), the ability 
to leverage dispersed capabilities effectively is seen by most international business (IB) 
scholars as a key source of competitive advantage for MNCs (Zander, 1999; Ernst and Kim, 
2002). The significant idea here is that the structural pattern of a firm is unique, and has the 
potential to confer competitive advantage.  
 Although the work on organizational design carried out in IB between 1970 and 1990 
has had a significant impact on the IB field and has largely faded since, it continues to have a 
strong influence on organization theory. Network forms of organization, typified by reciprocal 
patterns of communication and exchange (Powell, 1990; Powell et al., 2005), are seen as 
reshaping the global business architecture and marking the current period by their growing 
prevalence (e.g. Monge and Fulk, 1999; Parkhe et al., 2006). However, much of the theorizing 
on organizational design rests on the central role assigned to human choice and deliberate 
intention (e.g. Child, 1972; Pettigrew, 1987; Whittington, 1988). It is argued that deliberate 
actions of individuals determine the success and/or failure of organizations. Outcomes tend to 
be attributed to conscious choices, and purposeful actions of individuals (Chia and Holt, 2009). 
The same can be observed in accounts of network orchestration by MNCs (e.g. Dhanaraj and 
Parkhe, 2006). There is little room for theorizing the unexpected effects of unintended 
consequences of deliberate choices (MacKay and Chia, 2013). In this chapter, our objective is 
to show an interactive process of network orchestration that combines choice and change in an 
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unexpected way to produce a desired organizational outcome. Network orchestration is defined 
by those who assign a heroic status to agency, i.e. uphold the view that the deliberate actions 
of individuals determine the success or failure of an organization, as coordinating knowledge 
mobility, appropriating knowledge, and fostering network stability (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 
2006). Unlike arguments that celebrate the purposeful design processes led by hub firms in the 
formation and growth of a network (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Rowley et al., 2000), we highlight 
the importance of emerging strategy and the unintended consequence in bringing about a 
desirable outcome in MNCs’ efforts to coordinate and integrate globally-dispersed capabilities.  
We present a framework for network orchestration by drawing on organization theory 
in the following section. This is followed by an empirical illustration of key orchestration 
processes that Vodafone performed to create cash synergies in its key mobile network of 
infrastructure suppliers. The fourth section concludes the chapter by presenting the 
implications for IB of network orchestration.  
 
Network Orchestration  
There is increasing attention given to networks in which hub firms (Jarillo, 1988)—prominent 
actors (Knoke, 1994), flagship firms (Rugman and D’Cruz, 2000), or network orchestrators 
(Hacki and Lighton, 2001)—lack the benefit of hierarchical authority (e.g. Fulk, 2001). With 
widespread disintegration of value chains in many high-tech industries (Lorenzoni and Baden-
Fuller, 1995), the significance of network orchestration has become more prominent. The 
paradox here is how a hub firm or a network orchestrator coordinates and influences other 
network members over which it has no hierarchical control to achieve economic benefits.  
Organization theory literature highlights both chance and prior history, that is path 
dependence (Burton et al., 2002), and purposefully designed processes that are led by hub firms 
in the formation and growth of a network (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Rowley et al., 2000). In the 
5 
 
intentional view, hub firms are seen to possess the attributes necessary to lead the process of 
pulling resources and capabilities of network members. As network orchestrators, they aim to 
create and extract value from the network by integrating and coordinating processes, resources, 
and assets (Hinterhuber, 2002). Intermediate levels of control and incentives in network 
organizations do not necessarily equate with overall inefficiency of such a structure (Demil and 
Lecocq, 2006). Mutual dependence, strong personal relationships and reputation preclude 
agents from pursuing their own interests exclusively (Powell, 1990; Jones et al., 1997). 
However, in order to create value in such structures, it is commonly argued that there needs to 
be deliberate, purposeful action (e.g. Kogut, 2000). In the context of network orchestration, 
these are hypothesized as i) coordinating knowledge mobility, ii) appropriating knowledge, and 
iii) fostering network stability (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006).  
Mobilizing knowledge  
Mobilizing knowledge is defined as the ‘ease with which knowledge is shared, acquired, and 
deployed within the network’ (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006: 660). This is necessary as 
significant value cannot be created where knowledge is retained by each network member. Hub 
firms are able to assess the value of relevant knowledge at different points in the network and 
to coordinate its transfer where it is needed (Gulati, 1999). They tend to follow three specific 
processes to mobilize knowledge: knowledge absorption, network identification, and 
interorganizational socialization (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006). Knowledge absorption involves 
combining existing capabilities in new ways (Kogut and Zander, 1996). By establishing a 
common identity, hence confidence, among network members, a hub firm encourages open 
sharing of valuable knowledge (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000). This knowledge tends to be 
mobilized through socialization, that is formal and informal linkages, among network 
participants (Brown and Duguid, 2000).   
Appropriating knowledge  
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Appropriating knowledge in network orchestration involves governing a network member’s 
ability to capture value generated by mobilized knowledge (Teece, 1986, 2000). In its 
application to networks, appropriating knowledge implies evenly distributing the value created 
from knowledge mobility through an appropriability regime set up by the hub firm (Dhanaraj 
and Parkhe, 2006). This suggests a broad, consensual framework that averts any attempt to act 
opportunistically or leak information to external parties by the partners (Mowery et al., 1996). 
Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) suggest trust, procedural justice, and joint asset ownership 
mitigate concerns in appropriation. Social interactions that foster trust and reciprocity among 
network members are crucial in minimizing the risk of opportunistic behaviour (Gulati et al., 
2000). A network orchestrator serves the role of a champion in building up this trust. Procedural 
justice or the fairness of the decision process encourages voluntary cooperation (Sheppard and 
Tuchinsky, 1996). This can be enacted by hub firms through network resource allocation, 
conflict resolution decisions, and consistency in decision making (Kim and Mauborgne, 1991). 
Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) also purport that joint asset ownership, which is commonly 
observed in networks, can reduce the risk of responsibility shirking, create room for joint 
problem solving, and provide incentives for sharing rewards.   
Fostering network stability  
The third task in network orchestration is fostering network stability that enables growth and 
flexibility for members to enter and exit the network (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006). This rests 
on the assumption that loosely-coupled networks may experience unstable linkages 
encouraging, for instance, defection of network partners to other networks (e.g. Uzzi, 1997). 
The type of coordination displayed in the network is acknowledged to be one of ‘subtle 
leadership’ (Orton and Weick, 1990) rather than management. In other words, each network 
member is able to take initiatives. Change in the membership of a network through isolation, 
migration, cliques, and attrition poses a challenge to value creation (e.g. Lorenzoni and 
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Lipparini, 1999), limiting opportunities for the creation of social capital (e.g. Inkpen and Tsang, 
2005). The task of a hub firm as an orchestrator is to i) enhance or sustain reputation so that 
network members see a benefit in maintaining their links (Stuart, 2000), ii) encourage forward-
looking expectations of gains, and iii) promote multiplexity or interdependencies among 
network members through, for instance, multiple projects in order to reinforce ties (Kenis and 
Knoke, 2000).  
 In line with most previous research in organizational design, the three processes of 
network orchestration are perceived as planned, intentional actions. It is assumed that atomistic, 
rational calculation or a proactive ability to intentionally create, adapt, and control a specific 
network structure characterizes the process (e.g. Rowley et al., 2000). It is also contended that 
networks forms of organizations are driven initially by path-dependent processes, and 
subsequently adopt intentional management (Hite and Hesterly, 2001). Although we see the 
role of human agency, choice, and deliberate intention in explaining the conduct of 
organizations as significant, we do not see decisive interventions as necessarily bringing about 
a desired state of affairs.  Rather, we acknowledge the unintended effects of deliberate choices 
that contribute to shaping organizational circumstances (MacKay and Chia, 2013). The 
network orchestration processes that we highlight at Vodafone capture the very act of choosing 
a particular strategy in response to a specific objective that generated an unintended network 
form of organization.  
 
Research Methods  
We draw on a longitudinal action research, embracing a period of transformational change 
(December 1998 to November 2000) between two MNCs, Vodafone Group Plc. (“Vodafone”) 
and Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, i.e. more specifically LM Ericsson AB (“Ericsson”). 
The transformational change was motivated, through a network infrastructure supply chain, by 
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the Vodafone corporate objective to achieve cash synergies in its mobile network operations 
globally. Ericsson was a major supplier to Vodafone of said infrastructure and related services. 
The second author was the inaugural and co-leader of the initiative on behalf of Vodafone 
supported by an Ericsson counterparty. Though the primary stimulus was Vodafone, the two 
MNCs resolved to adopt a collective strategy to globalize their business relationship, 
recognizing and accepting that the financial benefits arising might be asymmetric. 
It is noteworthy that the contextual background of the case company changed over the 
transition period. The initial Vodafone country quorum comprised the UK, Holland, Greece 
and Australia and the corresponding Ericson operations. Vodafone subsequently merged with 
AirTouch Communications, Inc. (“AirTouch”) of California (1999), and this combination later 
acquired Mannesmann AG (“Mannesmann”) of Germany (2000). The consequence of this 
acquisition was the expansion in the number of Vodafone operators, ten in the longitudinal 
period of transition, i.e. the phase terminating when the interorganizational and inter-company 
relationships within each organization had evidenced transformed practices. Subsequently, two 
additional infrastructure suppliers became engaged with this synergy initiative. The 
Mannesmann AG acquisition resulted further in a range of synergy targets being committed to 
the financial markets. 
In 1998, the second author as the IT and Project Management Director in Vodafone 
(UK), in advance of an impending merger with AirTouch, assumed responsibility for the 
achievement of the Vodafone financial targets. These could only be achieved through 
mobilizing the commitment of the operating companies that actually transacted business locally 
with Ericsson. 
Data collection comprised a chronological sequence of all key meetings, with the venue 
and the purpose thereof, of the Vodafone and Ericsson members by organizational position, 
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the Minutes of the meetings, and data sources and notations. Table 1 lists the chronology of all 
meetings in the case company.  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Of note are the Global Supply Chain Management (GSCM) and eRelationship meetings 
supplemented by a series of country visits conducted by the second author. The purpose of the 
country and ad hoc meetings by the second author was to support the promotion of the 
infrastructure supply chain globalization initiative, and to establish transparency and trust to 
bring on board the local operating companies in the transformational activities. For data sources 
more generally, reference was made to memorandums, exchanges/interactions at meeting 
venues, forums, video recordings of presentations, and emails. 
The second author was present at all listed meetings save for two, the Global Cost 
Synergies meeting in the UK in which he was a part-time attendee and that of April 2000. 
Throughout the longitudinal period of the transformation, the GSCM meeting remained the 
main coordination focal point to which the virtual works streams were subordinated, to which 
progress was reported and from which new initiatives were launched. The second author 
participated in all the eRelationship virtual work stream meetings and was in the latter stages 
appointed as its chairman. None of the meeting minutes were prepared by the second author. 
The meeting facts and observations were confirmed and/or supplemented by the observations 
and/or input noted by the actors present at the meetings.  
Whilst this case study provides for the opportunity of deep insight given the leadership 
role and participation of the second author, it too has the potential disadvantage of introducing 
bias. In mitigation thereof and post the case analysis, the second author held a workshop for 
the purpose of validating outcomes. The workshop was attended by the Ericsson Global 
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Contact (a Managing Director based in the UK), another senior Ericsson Contact (a Managing 
Director also based in the UK), an Ericsson Director from Sweden, a Vodafone Customer 
Executive based in the UK and two academic experts, who all confirmed the facts. For example, 
one of the Supplier Global Contacts stated ‘the Programme has, during the past two years, 
strengthened the relationship the Customer and Supplier in a way that never would have been 
possible in a purely commercial relationship’.  
 
Illustration of Network Orchestration: Vodafone’s Inception of a Requisite Organization 
By January 1998, the second author, as the IT and Project Management Director in Vodafone 
Limited (the UK mobile operating company) had initiated the functional transformation of 
procurement to a supply chain function, including for the provision of mobile network 
infrastructure sourced from Ericsson (Supplier). The infrastructure included mobile network 
equipment, software and a number of related supporting services. This activity was to transform 
and optimize supply, deploy processes and practices locally in addition to contributing to the 
achievement of the cost reductions sought by Vodafone. 
An illustration of the point is the deployment of base station equipment in containers to 
field locations adjacent to masts on which the antennas are mounted. Hitherto, Vodafone 
procured to its warehouse the container and all equipment/parts to be installed therein. Then 
either field engineers assembled, installed and tested the equipment/parts locally in the 
warehouse, after which the completed container was transported to its assigned field location, 
or the container and the equipment/parts were all shipped unassembled to the field location and 
the installation and testing process was carried out there. This led to variability in the standards 
of quality and physical configuration of the installation owing to undefined assembly and test 
instructions, as well as costs in deploying field engineers in this mode. The transformed supply 
chain alternative was to contract Ericsson to source its own and all other required third party 
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equipment/parts and to build, integrate and commission/test the configuration in a factory 
environment according to defined assembly, test and quality processes, after which they could 
organize the shipment of the completed container directly to its assigned field location. The 
impact was to relieve Vodafone of the cost of all component procurement, warehousing and 
the deployment of field engineers to system build and test, and to achieve higher quality and 
consistent factory output delivered directly to site. 
Whilst perhaps not unique in practice, these and the ensuing other changes in the supply 
chain context marked the transformation and optimization of extant working processes and 
practices within and between operating divisions in Vodafone UK, namely supply chain, 
technology and operations. The inter-MNC processes and practices were enhanced too, not to 
mention that Ericsson was the benefactor of an increased services business. Although there was 
resistance to the variant propositions within Vodafone, business ambitions were realized by 
adopting an inclusive, progressive and incremental approach. In May 1998, the Board of 
Vodafone Limited approved the second author’s proposals for a UK policy on the separation 
of roles and responsibilities of Supply Chain Management and the Technology. 
In the latter part of 1998, and in advance of the impending merger of Vodafone with 
AirTouch Communications Inc. of California, the anticipated benefit of enhanced cost 
synergies between the extant Vodafone mobile operating company interests and those of 
AirTouch was promoted by the Vodafone M&A team. A financial benefit of the merger was 
anticipated to be the opportunity for enhanced synergies from lessons learned and shared due 
to the increase in number of mobile network operators in the merged businesses that may 
otherwise not have been realized. Initially, this prompted discussions internal to Vodafone 
between the extant operators led/hosted by the second author. However, all parties were 
constrained from commercial information exchanges due to each country operation being 
bounded by Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) obligations in the local contracts with Ericsson. 
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This quorum of operators and the percentage equity ownership of Vodafone Group Plc. at that 
time were the UK (100%), Libertel of Holland (70%), Panafon of Greece (55%) and Vodafone 
Australasia (to include Fiji) (91%), each of which were existing Ericsson network infrastructure 
customers. The second author also established, with the Ericsson newly appointed global 
leader, a shared interest and a strategy in seeking to globalize interorganizational commercial 
relationships by enhancing all aspects of the (end-to-end) network infrastructure supply chain 
management processes from the source of supply through to network deployment and the 
support thereof such as warranties, software updates, and reverse logistics. 
There were no preordained agreed scope of work, organization structures, budget, levels 
of authority, or formal governance arising from the decision to implement a global supply 
chain. In other words, the intra- and interorganizational processes and commercial outcomes 
were not envisaged, prescribed or planned. Rather, there was a polarizing Vodafone objective 
to attain cash synergies in the network infrastructure supply chain and with an acceptance that 
the benefits arising thereof may be asymmetric and not shared. 
With the agreement of the Ericsson global leader, the second author invited the current 
Vodafone local operating company interests and their local Ericsson counterparts to the joint 
Vodafone-Ericsson inaugural Global Supply Chain Management (GSCM) meeting to be hosted 
by Vodafone Limited. In February 1999, to overcome the aforesaid issue of confidentiality, it 
was a requirement that each attending company sign a group NDA that enabled the open 
sharing between the parties of all hitherto confidential commercial information. This was the 
first globalizing step of an emerging and new interorganizational relationship, each 
organization being treated as a homogenous whole and each country identified jointly as a 
single entity for the purposes of the new journey. This forum was to become the catalyst for 
transformational change within which social and intellectual capital could develop through 
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sharing of knowledge and building of a common identity. These were hindered in the former 
silo-based disaggregated interorganizational relationships. 
To that end, it was agreed that the GSCM forum would be a Steering Group and that 
detailed (virtual) assignments should be assigned and delivered jointly by the Vodafone and 
Ericsson participating local companies. It was further agreed that the second author, through 
the UK Company, and with the Ericsson global leader would conclude the first commercial 
Global Agreement. This was an initiative that had already been underway in the UK and the 
outcome of which would now be of synergy benefit to the participating Vodafone operating 
companies, as the variant interorganizational relationships would, through this unified 
collaboration, be treated as one by Ericsson. 
A number of virtual work streams were initiated to include global terms and conditions 
for products procured from Ericsson (Global Price Book), to converge radio base station 
equipment configurations, to analyze and propose a network-converged switching requirement, 
and to establish common software, audit test and delivery methodologies (see Table 2).  
  
Insert Table 2 about here  
 
A work stream, assigned by country, consisted of a combination of local resources of 
both MNCs and the support, as required and decided by those leading the work stream, of other 
interested countries. It was agreed that progress of these and any other/new work streams would 
be reported at the GSCM meetings. Virtual teams could be independently set up with invitees 
of a given country member’s choice regardless of whether or not these members attended the 
GSCM meetings. 
Of significance here was the work stream that was to lead to the introduction, by the 
second author, of the concept of eRelationship (previously known as Groupware). The 
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eRelationship environment was created and hosted by Ericsson on an IT platform in Stockholm 
in 1999. It was a bi-directional web portal or a virtual environment for both global and local 
interorganizational information and knowledge sharing, all intended to epitomize the 
relationship within and between the two organizations. Key, however, was that the placement, 
the management thereof, of information and access rights were to be governed by the 
contributors utilizing a set of software tools. There was to be no centralized control. Save for 
commercially sensitive information, the ethos was that all information would be accessible by 
all employees of either MNC, whether or not they were involved in the Vodafone-Ericsson 
business relationship. This was achieved. A further objective through the virtual work streams 
was to promulgate new practice and learning to others in the end-to-end supply chain within 
and between the MNC organizations for the betterment of their MNC and/or country 
operations. 
An impact of eRelationship was the increase in the unrestricted flow and/or exchange of 
unfiltered information within and between both MNCs. This was an open inter- and intra-
organizational model, beyond the control of the HQ of both MNCs. It extended to all registered 
intranet users who were not engaged in this particular business relationship. The value creation 
of intellectual capital was under virtual control, but it was reinforced by the evolved social 
capital, the momentum of which could be extracted from the various global forums and 
meetings that also became a catalyst for engagement. 
By May 2000, the eRelationship focus became formalized with clarity of strategic intent 
as is illustrated by the following highlights presented jointly by the Vodafone and Ericsson 
project leaders for the approval of the virtual working group. 
“The Vodafone (Customer) - Ericsson (Supplier) Global Portal must reflect the 
entire global relationship, in all its aspects, between Vodafone and Ericsson”; 
“Further, it is the aim that this eRelationship virtual environment becomes that 
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natural primary source of information and communication between the 
organizations, and as such is not constrained by time and/or location”; “it is 
anticipated that arising from this new paradigm will be the mutual requirements 
for changes in process, practices and organizations”; “In particular, this capability 
is crucial to the sustainable support of all global virtual workstreams and 
initiatives under the guidance of the GSCM virtual leadership”. (Ibbott, 2001: 
262-263)  
As a prime mover for the Vodafone Group, the second author became the catalyst within the 
network of its operating companies for the transformation of the network infrastructure supply 
chain, which was enabled through eRelationship to garner support from a critical mass of 
operating companies. None of the operating companies directly reported to the second author. 
Yet they were, in combination, the source of the realized cash synergies against which they 
were targeted in the Group business, because they were the ones to transact with Ericsson 
locally. The role required a non-hierarchical lead, transcending the vertical company 
hierarchies of the Vodafone operating companies and interceding in their collective local 
disaggregated business relationships with Ericsson. 
In order to create the global interorganizational community, following the inaugural 
meeting in the UK, the venue for the GSCM meetings was agreed to be variously convened in 
the countries of the participating joint MNC operating companies to engender an esprit de corps 
among the participants - to additionally include Holland, Greece, Sweden, Egypt, Australia, 
Portugal and Romania. Although the forum comprised of actors of variant hierarchical position, 
it had no formal status. The local companies of the MNCs took decisions collectively in these 
meetings to which the second author offered guidance and/or ascent as appropriate. This was, 
in practice, a conformant accession, by the Vodafone operating companies, of local decision 
making authority to the globalizing leadership on matters of commerce and conditions related 
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thereto e.g. the Global Price Book and its requirements for variant practices as a quid pro quo 
in return for supplier concessions. These GSCM meetings were observed to be highly inclusive 
regardless of country-of-origin, and company and/or job role. Of note too, was that the small 
global team of the second author comprised actors and/or secondees from Vodafone operating 
companies’ supply chain or technical teams, recommended by the extant global team members 
and supported by the operating companies.  
The case data shown in Table 3 provide clear evidence of the nature of the boundary 
crossing as observed in multi-level job roles of participating actors.  
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
The vertical axis depicts the horizontal organization mix and hierarchical job roles within each 
MNC (Vodafone as Customer and Ericsson as Supplier). The horizontal axis documents the 
number of attendees at each of the GSCM meetings and of the eRelationship working group. 
In this context, the network organization was the plethora of the engaged and non-engaged 
operating companies of each of the MNC with Group/HQ engagement/support, whilst the 
eRelationship was an enabling means for the sharing of information and knowledge both 
globally and on projects locally. 
Through the strength of the boundary-crossing actors in the horizontal 
interorganizational structure, the local objections, resistance and/or reticence were overcome, 
for example, through the release of the Global Agreement. This Agreement provided for a 
consolidation of equipment and a limitation of configuration diversity in return for unified 
pricing and commercial terms. The following quote from the Listing of Particulars (page 9) 
offers a quantum to the magnitude of the synergy expectations in anticipation of the Vodafone 
AirTouch Plc. offer for Mannesmann AG: 
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“The Board expects the benefits of this transaction to generate synergies of 
approximately £500 million on a proportionate after tax cash flow basis in 2003 
(with approximately 20 per cent of such synergies coming from increased revenues, 
40 per cent from cost savings and 40 per cent from capital expenditure savings) and 
approximately £600 million on a proportionate after tax cash flow basis in 2004 
(with approximately 25 per cent of such savings coming from increased revenues, 
40 per cent from cost savings and 35 per cent from capital expenditure savings).” 
The network infrastructure synergies discussed here were substantially contributions 
made to the capital expenditure objectives, though operating expense activities were also 
pursued. Vodafone reported, in its Interim Results Release for the Six Months to 30 September 
2002, “Good progress has been made on the synergies arising from the Mannesmann 
transaction. It is expected that the £500m of forecast post-tax cash flow synergies for the year 
ending March 2003 will be exceeded”. Further, in its 2004 Annual Report Vodafone stated 
“Mannesmann has been integrated into the Group and the expected synergies for the year ended 
31 March 2004 announced at the time of the acquisition have been achieved, exceeding the 
target mainly as result of higher savings from capital expenditure, handset procurement and 
additional revenue opportunities”. The Customer-Supplier GSCM forum enabled the transfer 
of experiential knowledge and the dispersion of lead responsibilities of internationalization to 
actors representing various customer operating company equity interests. For instance, as the 
Group Supply Chain Management (SCM) Director of Vodafone Procurement Company 
(VPC), Detlef Schultz, indicates, the supply chain management resulted in a paradigm shift by 
2008. VPC became a strategic sourcing center. By 2011, the company was leveraging synergies 
beyond boundaries. The VPC was targeting new areas of spend (presentation by the GSCM 
Director). By the same token, the Customer senior lawyer from the US perceived the GSCM 
meetings as follows.  
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“For the first time, there was vigorous dialogue among the Customer’s operating 
companies regarding the vendor’s products, performance, price, and future 
plans…[The second author] moderated the discussions, planned the ongoing 
meetings and work of the (global Customer-Supplier) team…These small beginnings 
yielded large results. Through the improvement in communication and reductions in 
unnecessary product (configurations), the vendor was able to improve its 
efficiency…the bulk of the improvements in pricing came from the supply chain 
process”. 
As a point of note, in 2001 Vodafone introduced formal governance in pursuit of a 
Mannesmann synergy commitment that formalized the relationship between the Vodafone 
Group functions and its local operating companies. Of developmental relevance to the period 
beyond the case study, was the formation of the SCM Council and the IT and Technology 
(ITTM) Council; the second author participated in both forums. These forums decided jointly 
on matters of technology, its sourcing and deployment, to which the Vodafone operating 
companies were obliged. The informal virtual organization remained intact and continued to 
function below the SCM Council, which comprised of representatives of large OpCos, 
representatives of smaller OpCos, Group CTO, and the Group Technology representatives. 
This body served to ratify what was informally agreed or to assert decisions taken outside the 
Council. The second author represented, on behalf of the informal virtual organization, 
proposals for adoption on Group matters relating to the mobile network infrastructure. 
 
Discussion 
We began by asking what role network orchestration serves in MNCs’ coordination and 
integration of capabilities that are globally dispersed. Our findings, as summarized in Table 4, 
progress a perspective on MNC configuration that takes into account the unexpected effects of 
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unintended consequences of deliberate choices. This approach celebrates the importance of 
emerging strategy and unintended consequence in bringing about a desirable outcome in 
MNCs’ efforts to coordinate and integrate globally dispersed capabilities.   
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
 Vodafone, in agreement with Ericsson, played a pivotal role in the formation, growth, 
and success of its network infrastructure. As the case suggests, knowledge absorption and 
interorganizational socialization are significant in enabling knowledge mobility. GSCM 
meetings, work streams (which reflected boundary-crossing activity), and the eRelationship 
platform enabled the exchange of commercial knowledge and the development of a common 
understanding relevant for the case initiative. What is important to note here is that the hub 
firm or the orchestrator - Vodafone - neither aimed to control knowledge mobility, nor was it 
in a position to assess the value of relevant knowledge at different points in the network. Each 
local company was treated as an independent entity or node rather than as part of a hierarchical 
unity of command. Although the Vodafone objective was to attain cost synergies, this was 
pursued through mutually respected horizontal relationships. The role of Vodafone was one of 
a catalyst for learning at the organization’s boundaries (Lyles and Salk, 1996). Each virtual 
work stream, led by a self-organized country and including local members from Vodafone and 
Ericsson, leveraged resources and interacted horizontally with other teams in their base 
companies, and in the broader joint MNC communities, as necessary. This reinforced a 
common identity among network partners (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006). The GSCM forum 
also served as a socialization platform that encouraged the accrual of social capital (Ahuja, 
2000).  
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 Vodafone’s effort in distributing value equitably in appropriating knowledge involved 
the signing of a group NDA. This was to facilitate the open sharing of confidential commercial 
information, and to dispel the fear that the openness of partners in the network would not be 
taken advantage of (Teece, 2000). Although there was a deliberate choice to attain cost 
synergies, it was well recognized by the partners that the benefits would be asymmetric. There 
was no conventional agreement around the provision of visibility or the sharing of the cost 
reductions achieved. It was simply acknowledged that any tangible and/or intangible benefits 
arising from joint endeavours would be retained solely by the party in question. For instance, 
Vodafone’s equity-based grouping required the engagement of management teams of each 
entity who had to buy-in to ideas to support the organizational transformation. By contrast, 
Ericsson’s fully-owned subsidiaries had less scope to resist the propositions. Voluntary 
cooperation was also encouraged through social interactions with partner firms and the use of 
trust and joint problem-solving that was championed by Vodafone. High levels of trust 
prevailed, in particular, among key Vodafone and Ericsson individuals, whose relationship 
dated back to 1983.  
 What is striking in the case is that fostering network stability was not a critical task of 
the network orchestrator (cf. Kenis and Knoke, 2002). The interdependencies established 
among network members, or local operating companies of Vodafone and Ericsson, through 
GCSM meetings and virtual work stream activities convinced members of a benefit in 
maintaining their links. Reciprocity enabled continuity. Vodafone was tasked with delivering 
a reliable efficient network to its customers, and Ericsson had to provide its key customers such 
as Vodafone with reliable, cost-effective and technologically advanced products and support. 
However, the formalization of the network was never set as an objective. The emergent 
network, composed of the Vodafone global and virtual management team, Lead operating 
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companies (supplier clusters) including Ericsson, Nortel, Nokia and Siemens, and remaining 
Vodafone operating companies, was an informal one (see Figure 1).      
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
   
The network was self-governing to assure relevant inputs and inclusion in execution. The 
network orchestrator upheld the view that the emergent informal structure should remain non-
hierarchical in operation. This was seen as contributing to the successful economic 
performance of the network. Although a formal governance structure (Supply Chain 
Management (SCM) Council, and IT and Technology Management (ITTM) Council) was 
subsequently introduced, this did not intervene with the informal functioning of the virtual 
organization.  
 The case reported here demonstrates an interactive process of creative evolution, i.e. 
choice and change interacting to produce consequences that influence organizational outcomes 
(the achievement of cost synergies) in an unexpected way (through the emergence of a network 
organization). It offers a process view that recognizes the importance of action, interaction, 
spontaneous change, and their unintended consequence. Although the intentional view offers 
insight into the reasons for Vodafone’s search for an organizational means to achieve cost 
synergies, it is essentially limited in its ability to explain fully the emergence of a network 
organization to achieve such synergies. Throughout the transformation process, there was no 
predetermined underlying order that produced stable choice sets. Order emerged spontaneously 
as GSCM and work stream meetings were held. Therefore, we argue that the process of network 
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orchestration must be understood as driven by choice sets taken while creatively coping with 
change rather than as primarily choice sets deliberately taken in the sequential pursuit of goals.   
Conclusion 
The IB literature is not foreign to the coordination tasks of managing a network of established 
foreign subsidiaries, and an analysis of the competitive advantages that arise from potential 
economies of scope (e.g. Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990). An MNC’s structure has been the most 
enduring idea of IB (Ghoshal and Nohria, 1993) up until the 1990s. Given the radical change 
in the way economic value is created, and empowered by the digital information technology, 
network organizations are taking a leading role in economic and social innovations 
(Birkinshaw and Hagström, 2000). Although the relevance of exploiting external resources 
(Teece et al., 1997), and the ability to integrate efforts of different actors (Grant, 1996) have 
been acknowledged, the processes in orchestrating a network remain fairly unarticulated and 
projected as predetermined and intended. Drawing on organization theory, we shed light on the 
process of network orchestration consisting of mobilizing knowledge, appropriating 
knowledge, and fostering network stability. We emphasize action and process as opposed to 
position and structure. Structure alone does not create the benefit, but the entrepreneurial 
approach of a hub firm to turn the structure into a benefit is noteworthy. Unlike other studies 
that focus on the deliberate acts and intended consequences of central firms to exploit and 
manage the network (e.g. Ahuja, 2000), we consider the unintended consequence of an 
intentional action, thus recognizing the reality of in situ responses of network orchestrators 
themselves.   
 We suggest that cultivating an internalized agility involving on-going creative 
adaptation is crucial to dealing with the unintended consequences of action in a world of 
increased adversity. We emphasize that organizations encourage innovation from within a 
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global virtual community, where appropriate, void of pre-emptive structure, and mandates save 
for alignment on the strategic ambition. Unintended but strategically consistent outcomes can 
be a bonus from wherever and whomever they emerge. A hierarchical position/role is not an 
exclusive domain within which effective outcomes may emerge. The case study also illustrates 
that endeavours into uncharted areas of the business do not necessarily require detailed 
planning, but instead allow leadership to orchestrate and guide the situational dynamics. It 
helps to consider acknowledging the doctrine of equivalence of the emergent participant 
contributions, being constrained only by a positive progression and momentum towards that 
espoused and agreed strategy.   
 The case reported here considers the interworking of two (Supplier-Customer) MNCs 
within a specific set of circumstances. This limits our ability to generalize some of our findings. 
However, our fundamental message applies across the board, that a dynamic analysis of 
networks, which recognizes the reality of change in inter-firm network relationships (e.g. Kenis 
and Knoke, 2002) and the role of emergent strategy and unintended consequences of strategic 
change (e.g. Balogun and Johnson, 2005; Boisot and McKelvey, 2010), is a more representative 
way of understanding the way in which today’s MNCs coordinate and integrate globally-
dispersed capabilities. Future research can seek to explore network orchestration processes in 
differently-sized organizations and sectors that are exposed to varying intensity of competition. 
This would help deepen understanding into the creative nature of network orchestration.        
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Table 1. Chronological sequence of all meetings  
 
Meeting category GSCM 
Meeting 
eRelationship Ad 
Hoc 
Second 
author 
country 
visits 
Supplier New 
GSCM 
initiatives 
Comments 
Meeting Dates:        
February 25-26, 1999 X      Inaugural GSCM meeting in Newbury, UK 
March 23, 1999    X   Libertel in Maastricht, Holland 
April 14-15, 1999 X      Maastricht, Holland 
May 26-27, 1999 X      Athens, Greece 
July 26-27, 1999   X    Former AirTouch properties in Amsterdam 
August 2, 1999    X   Ericsson in Holland 
August 3-4, 1999    X   Panafon and Ericsson jointly in Athens, Greece 
August 5-6, 1999    X   Misrfone and Ericsson jointly in Cairo, Egypt 
August 13, 1999   X    Meeting that included eRelationship in 
Stockholm 
September 2-3, 1999 X      Nynashamn, Near Stockholm, Sweden 
September 10, 1999  X     Inaugural meeting in Amsterdam, Holland 
September 14-15, 1999   X    Global Cost No. 1 Synergies in Newbury, UK 
September 16, 1999    X   Libertel meeting in Maastricht, Holland 
September 17, 1999    X   Düsseldorf, Germany 
October 6, 1999    X   Airtel only in Madrid, Spain 
October 11, 1999  X     Amsterdam, Holland 
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October 21, 1999      X New infrastructure supplier presentation in 
Copenhagen, Denmark 
November 2, 1999   X    Technical Operations Symposium in Newbury, 
UK 
November 3, 1999  X     London, UK 
November 4, 1999     X  GSM Systems Program Managers in 
Stockholm 
November 22, 1999    X   Telecel and Ericsson separately in Lisbon, 
Portugal 
December 1, 1999    X   Panafon and Ericsson jointly in Athens, Greece 
December 7, 1999     X  TTS Global Workshop, Nr Stockholm 
December 9, 1999       D2 meeting in London, UK 
December 21, 1999  X     London, UK 
January 11-12, 2000 X      Cairo, Egypt 
February 3-4, 2000    X   Vodafone and Ericsson jointly in Sydney, 
Australia 
February 4-5, 2000    X   Ericsson jointly with Vodafone, Fiji, then 
Vodafone, New Zealand both in Auckland 
February 18, 2000     X  Business Management Conference, Hong 
Kong 
March 14, 2000  X     London, UK 
March 21-22, 2000      X Inaugural IT GSCM meeting in Sydney, 
Australia 
April 2-3, 2000   X    Global Cost Synergies in Bucharest, Romania 
May 5, 2000  X     London, UK 
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May 10-12, 2000 X      Lisbon, Portugal 
June 15, 2000   X    Financial Directors’ Conference, UK 
June 21, 2000    X   D2 meeting in Münich, Germany; new 
supplier 
July 4-5, 2000    X   Ericsson meeting in Düsseldorf, Germany 
October 2-5, 2000 X      Bucharest, Romania 
Source: Ibbott (2001) 
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Table 2. The key virtual work streams initiated 
 
Key Virtual Work Streams Brief Description Lead Country 
   
Global agreement The creation and agreement of a global ‘price 
book’ that would cover all GSM products 
purchased from Ericsson. 
UK 
   
Base station (BTS) configurations An agreed convergence towards, and a set of, 
BTS configurations 
UK 
   
MSC and BSC switching configurations Analysis and discovery of a set of MSC and BSC 
configurations that could be adopted by all 
countries 
Greece, transferred later to Germany 
   
Groupware Analysis and creation of groupware (later known 
as eRelationship) for all inter-organisational IS 
(Information Systems) that allows information 
sharing and product ordering. 
Netherlands 
   
Common software, audit, test and delivery The elimination of repeated software build and 
testing. 
Australia 
Source: Ibbott and O’Keefe (2004) 
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Table 3.  Composition of actors in the GSCM and eRelationship meetings 
 
 GSCM Meetings eRelationship Working Group Meetings 
Actor positions No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 No. 4 No. 5 No. 6 No. 7 No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 No. 4 No. 5 No. 6 
Customer Org.:              
Managing Director 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Director 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Executive 1 2 2 3 7 6 6 1 1 1 1 2 1 
Senior Manager 2 3 3 8 8 8 13 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Other actors 1 3 3 4 3 6 3 1 1 0 1 1 2 
Total in attendance: 7 10 9 17 20 22 24 3 3 2 5 5 4 
Supplier Org.:              
Managing Director 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 
Director 0 2 2 1 2 2 2 0 1 0 2 2 1 
Executive 3 3 3 7 8 9 5 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Senior Manager 0 2 2 7 12 12 16 2 2 3 5 9 2 
Other actors 1 1 4 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Total in attendance: 6 10 13 20 25 26 26 4 5 6 10 13 7 
 
Note: The GSCM meetings were the core forum, and the eRelationship Working Group meetings were a subordinated virtual work stream 
Source: Ibbott (2001) 
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Table 4. Summary of Network Orchestration Process 
Governance Mechanism Mobilizing Knowledge Appropriating Knowledge Fostering Network Stability 
Global Supply Chain 
Management (GSCM) 
Exchange of commercial knowledge and 
socialization for a common 
understanding  
(Pre-supplier and Vodafone meetings 
were held in advance of the GSCM 
meetings) 
Trust formation through social 
interaction between the members of 
the second author’s global team and 
operating companies, in particular, 
those having direct representation of 
the Global Supply Chain Council 
Convincing members of a benefit in 
maintaining links: the early-day operating 
company engagement was based on an 
acceptance to act in the community’s best 
interests; 
Drawing the core global team from the 
engaged operating companies for 
collaborative decision-making and 
execution; 
Creating the opportunity for participating 
operating companies to be the host 
location for the GSCM meetings 
Work streams, in 
particular Groupware 
Leveraging of resources and horizontal 
interaction with other teams in base 
companies and the broader joint MNC 
communities 
Informally motivating the participation 
of trusted skilled resources from either 
organization that was perceived by the 
engaged work stream participants to 
add capability to work stream 
endeavours 
Convincing local and global members of 
the economic benefits arising from the 
collaboration; 
The resource quantum of the quorums 
was flexible as to the dynamics of the 
leadership  
eRelationship platform Exchange of commercial, technical and 
operational knowledge and socialization 
for a common understanding; 
The bi-directional portal was intended as 
the embodiment of the business 
relationship between Vodafone and 
Ericsson that was visible to all in either 
organization with corporate intranet 
access to encourage convergence of 
practice 
Encouraging open and unfiltered 
communication and access to 
information by either organization, 
departments or resources therein 
Providing for clusters locally to establish 
workspaces to manage businesses locally 
such as to establish a common set of 
country-specific documentation 
Group Non-disclosure 
Agreement 
Providing for the release of information 
otherwise considered to be confidential 
‘Grandfathering’ of prior agreement 
locally in mitigating matters to be 
agreed globally  
 
Achieving transparency through openness, 
cooperation and collaboration on matters 
such as optimizing processes, 
configuration diversity, and acceptance 
procedures 
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Equity-based grouping Actively publishing the Vodafone Group 
cost synergy ambitions  
Engagement of management teams of 
each entity with operating companies 
for bilateral discussions and 
information sharing 
Establishing interdependencies among 
network members through regular 
engagement to stimulate and guide 
towards Vodafone Group cost synergy 
ambitions 
Source: Ibbott (2001) 
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Figure 1. Governance Structure 
 
 
Source: Ibbott (2007) 
 
